Abstract
The development of the construction industry generates construction waste which could contribute to environmental issues. Construction waste reduction management plays an important role in directly reducing emissions and solving the environmental pollution caused by construction waste. The limited rationality hypothesis and an evolutionary game model are used to construct a simulation model for the effects of environmental policies’ influences on the behavior of government and construction enterprises in construction waste reduction activities. Simulation results show that: (1) The government and enterprises evolve in the same direction under the sewage fees system or the subsidy system. The relationship between the initial ratio of the two sides and the position of the saddle point determines the evolution direction of the system. (2) The government could adjust the sewage fees rate, the penalty ratio, and the upper limit of construction waste emission to obtain a superior effect under the sewage fees system. As the subsidy system, the government could adjust the unit subsidy and the upper limit of construction waste emissions by enterprises. (3) The evolution times of the different systems are different. The time required to evolve to a stable state is shorter under the sewage fees system. Under the subsidy system, the time to evolve to a non-reduced state is longer, and the time to evolve to a reduced state is about the same as the time for the government to evolve to a checked state. The time required to evolve to the reduced state is about the same as the time required for the government to evolve to the checked state. This study develops an evolutionary game model between the government and construction enterprises in construction waste reduction activities. This study helps the government analyze the influence of various policies on enterprises’ reduction behaviors. The findings could help the government formulate appropriate policies to guide enterprises in waste reduction.