Abstract
The concept and methodology of traditional Defense in Depth (DID) was challenged in the Fukushima nuclear accident. In order to fix the weakness of the traditional emergency strategies of nuclear power plants (NPPs) and to enhance the DID for nuclear safety, the U.S. Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) put forward the concept of Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) for the special purpose of beyond-design-basis external event (BDBEE) hazard mitigation and the corresponding FLEX support guidelines (FSG). The theory has been wildly spread and accepted by many countries that generate nuclear power. The research on the FLEX strategy is a new trend in nuclear engineering in the recent decade. It provides not only fixed on-site equipment/devices but also on- and off-site portable resources to strengthen the reliability of the nuclear safety system, especially for the disaster/hazards (similar to the Fukushima nuclear accident) triggered by BDBEEs. After a brief introduction of the FLEX strategy, four opportunities and ten challenges are summarized. Subsequently, in view of these challenges and technical difficulties, five suggestions for future work are recommended.