LAPSE:2023.7010
Published Article
LAPSE:2023.7010
Distributed Mitigation Layers for Voltages and Currents Cyber-Attacks on DC Microgrids Interfacing Converters
February 24, 2023
The wide use of communication layers in DC microgrids to transmit voltage and current measurements of each distributed generator unit (DGU) increases the possibility of exposure to cyber-attacks. Cyber-attackers can manipulate the measured data to distort the control system of microgrids, which may lead to a shutdown. This paper proposes distributed mitigation layers for the false data injection attacks (FDIA) on voltages and currents of DGUs in meshed DC microgrids. The proposed control strategy is based on integrating two layers for cyber-attack detection and mitigation to immune the primary and the secondary control loops of each DGU. The first layer is assigned to mitigate FDIAs on the voltage measurements needed for the voltage regulation task of the primary control loop. The second layer is devoted to the mitigation of FDIAs on the DGU current measurements, which are crucial for the secondary control level to guarantee the proper current sharing of each DGU. Artificial neural networks (ANNs) are employed to support these layers by estimating the authenticated measurements. Different simulation and experimental case studies are provided to demonstrate the proposed mitigation layers’ effectiveness in detecting and mitigating cyber-attacks on voltage and current measurements. The simulation and experimental results are provided to evaluate the dynamic performance of the suggested control approach and to ensure the accurate operation of DC microgrids despite the existence of cyber-attacks on the measurements employed in the control strategy. Moreover, the control strategy succeeds to keep the maximum voltage error and the maximum error in current sharing within tolerance.
Keywords
control, cyber-security, false data injection attacks, microgrids, mitigation layer
Suggested Citation
EL-Ebiary AH, Mokhtar M, Mansour AM, Awad FH, Marei MI, Attia MA. Distributed Mitigation Layers for Voltages and Currents Cyber-Attacks on DC Microgrids Interfacing Converters. (2023). LAPSE:2023.7010
Author Affiliations
EL-Ebiary AH: Department of Electrical Power & Machines, Faculty of Engineering, Ain Shams University, Cairo 11517, Egypt [ORCID]
Mokhtar M: Department of Electrical Power & Machines, Faculty of Engineering, Ain Shams University, Cairo 11517, Egypt
Mansour AM: Power Electronics and Energy Conversion Department, Electronics Research Institute, Cairo 12622, Egypt [ORCID]
Awad FH: Power Electronics and Energy Conversion Department, Electronics Research Institute, Cairo 12622, Egypt
Marei MI: Department of Electrical Power & Machines, Faculty of Engineering, Ain Shams University, Cairo 11517, Egypt [ORCID]
Attia MA: Department of Electrical Power & Machines, Faculty of Engineering, Ain Shams University, Cairo 11517, Egypt [ORCID]
Journal Name
Energies
Volume
15
Issue
24
First Page
9426
Year
2022
Publication Date
2022-12-13
Published Version
ISSN
1996-1073
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Original Submission
Other Meta
PII: en15249426, Publication Type: Journal Article
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LAPSE:2023.7010
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doi:10.3390/en15249426
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Feb 24, 2023
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