The undersupplies of feedstock and high costs have hindered the development of China’s biomass power generation. In this paper, the noncooperative game, farmer−broker cooperative game, and broker−biomass power plant cooperative game, under government incentives, are constructed and analyzed. The optimal decision strategies and profits for these three cases are obtained, while numerical examples and sensitivity analysis are conducted, aiming at illustrating some specific features of the games. It is shown that the government plays a critical role in the development of utilizing agribiomass for power generation and can work better in cooperative games. In addition, both agribiomass supply quantity and profits of supply chain members are higher in cooperative than in noncooperative game. Meanwhile, farmers can get the maximum profit in the broker−biomass power plant cooperative game, while biomass power plant makes the maximum profit in the farmer−broker cooperative game. To guide the healthy development of the industry, there is an urgent need for further exploration of the biomass supply chain management and coordination issue. Specifically, the cooperative game for establishing optimal feedstock price subsidy policy will be done by way of adjusting government incentives and alliance profit distribution.